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NOTES
TURF WARS: STREET GANGS
AND THE OUTER LIMITS OF RICO'S
"AFFECTING COMMERCE" REQUIREMENT
Frank D 'Angelo*
In response to the increasingly vast economic impact of organized crime,
Congress in 1970 enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) to provide federal prosecutors additional tools to
combat such crime. RICO requires that enterprises whose members are
charged with violating the Act must "affect interstate commerce. " Courts
have held that RICO may be applied to enterprises with no economic
motivation so long as they minimally affect interstate commerce. However,
given the Act's economic history and interstate commerce element, its
application to noneconomic intrastate enterprises presents a special
problem. This Note argues that, consistent with relevant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and doctrines of statutory interpretation, future courts should
read RICO to require that noneconomic intrastate enterprises substantially
affect interstate commerce.
INTRODUCTION
On December 15, 2005, a federal jury sentenced Jackson Nascimento to
171 months in jail and 60 months of supervised release for shooting one
person and conspiring to murder several others.' Nascimento was a
member of a street gang that operated exclusively within the city of Boston
and the sole purpose of which was to attack members of rival Boston
gangs.2 Nascimento, however, was convicted of violating a federal statute
that criminalizes racketeering activity and that identifies as a specific
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to Professor
Thomas Lee for his invaluable guidance throughout the Note-writing process, to my friends
for their timely moral support, and to my parents, Enrico and Angela, for their constant love
and encouragement.
1. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, 7, United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25
(1 st Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1152); see also Brief for the United States at 12-15, Nascimento, 491
F.3d 25 (Nos. 06-1152, 06-1153, 06-1154) (describing the circumstances surrounding the
shooting at issue).
2. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 30. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
accepted the lower court's ruling that the gang did not deal drugs. See id. at 30 n. 1.
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concern the economic impact of such activity.3 The statute's legislative
history indicates that it was "designed to attack the infiltration of legitimate
business" 4 and to eradicate organized criminal activity "that annually
drain[ed] billions of dollars from America's economy."'5
Nascimento was convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 6 RICO 7 was passed by Congress in 1970 as
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act.8 Its most important liability
provision is § 1962(c), which makes it illegal for "any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity." 9  That RICO provision contains the Act's federal
"jurisdictional hook"-its statutory anchor to Article I congressional power.
Federal prosecutors may not charge an individual under RICO unless his or
her enterprise is engaged in interstate commerce or the enterprise's
activities affect interstate commerce. 10
RICO's early history suggests that it was intended to have a narrow and
specific scope."1 When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, however, it
mandated that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."' 2 Over the decades that followed, prosecutors, seeking to test
just how liberally courts would construe the Act's language, invoked RICO
to charge members of a panoply of new and increasingly noneconomic
criminal enterprises. 13  For the most part, courts embraced RICO's
3. Jackson Nascimento was actually convicted of violating several federal statutes, but
this Note focuses on one: 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000). See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 31.
4. 115 Cong. Rec. 9566, 9567 (1969) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan).
5. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84
Stat. 922) 1073, 1073.
6. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 31.
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
8. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968);
see also Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 661, 661 (1987).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The Act also provides a detailed list of activities that constitute
"racketeering activity." Those include "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a
controlled substance." Id. § 1961(1)(A).
10. See id. § 1962(c). The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that an enterprise is
"engaged in commerce" when it is "directly engaged in the production, distribution, or
acquisition of goods or services in interstate commerce." United States v. Robertson, 514
U.S. 669, 672 (1995) (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283
(1975)).
11. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
12. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961 -1968).
13. See infra Part I.A. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's
(RICO) allure lay not only in its amenability to liberal construction, but also in its practical
statutory utility. The Act does not require mens rea beyond that necessary for its predicate
acts, and it provides for severe sanctions in addition to those for the mere underlying
offenses. Ross Bagley et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 44 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 901, 903 (2007); see also infra notes 68--69 and accompanying text.
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broadening application. In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that RICO may be used to prosecute not only economically motivated
criminal enterprises, but also legitimate businesses and enterprises without
a profit motive. 14
Cases like that of Jackson Nascimento, however, present the most
challenging and troubling applications of RICO. They force us to consider
the limits of the Act's purpose and language-specifically the Act's
"affecting commerce" language. Nascimento's gang was a small-scale
operation, unlike the larger, economically and politically entrenched Mafia
that the Act targeted in the 1970s. 15 Instead, it is the type of gang with
which a city police department would ordinarily concern itself. As an
organization, Nascimento's gang was not engaged in drug dealing,
organized gambling, loan-sharking, money laundering, or any other
economic activity. 16 To be sure, several members of the gang had dealt
drugs, but there was no evidence that their dealing was organized by or
connected to the gang.' 7 As an organization, it sought only to shoot
members of nearby rival gangs. 18 One such shooting resulted in the
temporary closing of a twenty-four-hour tire shop and thus arguably
affected "commerce" within the meaning of § 1962(c). 19
These facts reveal two critical deficiencies regarding the economic nature
of the activity at issue: (1) the economic activity was individualized-not
hierarchical, and (2) to the extent that there were economic effects, they
were incidental or secondary-not primary. Given this, can a gang like
Nascimento's be said to "affect interstate commerce"? In other words, can
RICO redress admittedly heinous gang violence with such tenuous
connections to interstate commerce? If so, what is the necessary proof?.
Although it is easy to mistake such questions for sympathy to the gang's
cause, such an interpretation misunderstands the fundamental jurisdictional
and evidentiary requirements at issue. The actions of Nascimento's gang
are no less reprehensible than the actions of La Cosa Nostra or any other
larger-scale crime syndicate. Murder is murder, and we should hope that
authorities would make use of all available tools to keep dangerous thugs
off the streets and behind bars. The critical question is whether, in these
situations, RICO may be constitutionally used to achieve that end.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the first court to
bring these concerns to the fore. In Waucaush v. United States, it noted that
prosecutors' use of RICO to convict a member of a noneconomically
14. See infra notes 61-64, 94-96 and accompanying text.
15. RICO was mostly a response to La Cosa Nostra, the Italian organized crime
enterprise that rose to prominence in the United States during the first half of the twentieth
century. For a discussion regarding the history of La Cosa Nostra's activities and federal
prosecutors' attack on the organization, see generally James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin,
Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter?, 25 Crime & Just. 129 (1999).
16. See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 30 n.l, 37 (lst Cir. 2007).
17. Seeid. at30n. 1.
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
19. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 43-44.
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motivated organization that engaged only in noneconomic intrastate activity
raised constitutional concerns.20 Prior cases had held that prosecutors could
satisfy RICO by demonstrating that intrastate enterprises had a de minimis
effect on interstate commerce; those cases, however, all addressed profit-
driven enterprises. 21 Given the unique concerns raised by noneconomic
enterprises, Waucaush held that federal prosecutors needed to demonstrate a
substantial, rather than a de minimis, effect on interstate commerce. 22
Last year, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
departed from the Sixth Circuit's holding in Waucaush.23  In upholding
Nascimento's conviction, it held that the normal de minimis standard
applies.24 This is an important distinction. Proving a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is a significant hurdle, whereas proving a de minimis
effect is, as one scholar has described, "a polite fiction, equivalent to no
required jurisdictional nexus at all."' 25 The applicable legal rule thus has
important prosecutorial implications.
The First Circuit based its holding on Gonzales v. Raich, a recent
Supreme Court case handed down after Waucaush.26 In Raich, the Court
held that Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities as part of
a comprehensive scheme of regulation that bears a substantial relation to
interstate commerce. 27  The Nascimento court held that Congress's
regulation of local violent activity does not raise any constitutional
concerns, and, thus, courts need not read RICO as requiring a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 28
Raich marked the first time in over a decade that the Supreme Court has
construed the Commerce Clause broadly to permit federal regulation over
intrastate activity. 29 Some have read the decision to signal an end to the
Court's recent trend of limiting Congress's power to regulate what may be
20. See Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2004).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 984 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding
a RICO conviction based only upon a de minimis effect on interstate commerce because "the
heart of [the defendants'] crimes, drug trafficking and extortion, [were] quintes-sential [sic]
illegal economic activities"); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that "a de minimis connection suffices for a RICO enterprise that 'affects' interstate
commerce," but addressing an enterprise engaging in economic activity such as illegal
gambling and extortion); United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996)
(noting that, in order to satisfy the affecting commerce requirement, "only a slight effect on
interstate commerce is required").
22. See Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 256-57.
23. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42-43.
24. See id.
25. Lynch, supra note 8, at 715 n.232.
26. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 40-43.
27. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2005). Specifically, Raich held that
Congress may regulate intrastate marijuana cultivation and use as part of a comprehensive
federal scheme regulating the use of controlled substances for medical purposes. See id. at
27.
28. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42-43.
29. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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seen as strictly local activity under the Commerce Clause. 30 That trend is
marked by United States v. Lopez31 and United States v. Morrison.32 In
Lopez, the Supreme Court prohibited Congress from using the Commerce
Clause to regulate gun possession in school zones, 33 and in Morrison,
domestic violence against women. 34 Others believe that Raich may not
signal an end to this recent trend; the case may simply amount to a
jurisprudential outlier.35
The question of RICO's applicability to street gangs, therefore, is not
merely a question of statutory construction. In other words, it is not
sufficient to interpret the words "affecting commerce" without reference to
wider historical and constitutional concerns. As a matter of plain language,
"affecting commerce" may very well mean "affecting commerce in any
way, even in a de minimis way." But that does not answer the ultimate
question. Even if we do assign the words "affecting commerce" their plain
meaning, should courts nonetheless construe them to mean "affecting
commerce in a substantial way" when applied to street gangs to (1) stay
faithful to congressional intent, and (2) avoid opening the statute to a
constitutional challenge under the governing Commerce Clause cases?
This Note argues that, to avoid a potential unconstitutional extension of
Congress's commerce power, RICO's "affecting commerce" language
should not be construed to require street gangs' local acts to have a mere de
minimis impact on interstate commerce. It also argues that, in this context,
Raich does not displace Lopez and Morrison. Part I considers RICO's
legislative history and expanding application, the evolution of Supreme
Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and the constitutional avoidance
doctrine-the use of which in Waucaush was criticized by the Nascimento
court. Part II lays out the split between the Sixth and First Circuits, tracks
their reasoning in Waucaush and Nascimento respectively, and details how
those courts employ different Commerce Clause analyses to reach divergent
conclusions. Finally, Part III explains why courts should adopt the
Waucaush approach and interpret RICO to require that noneconomic
intrastate enterprises substantially affect interstate commerce.
30. See, e.g., Steven K. Balman, Constitutional Irony: Gonzales v. Raich, Federalism
and Congressional Regulation of Intrastate Activities Under the Commerce Clause, 41 Tulsa
L. Rev. 125, 127 (2005) ("Gonzales v. Raich represents a great leap backward in Commerce
Clause doctrine and the jurisprudence of federalism."); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing
Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 823,
826 (2005) (noting that, in Raich, "Lopez's prohibitory rule was watered down to the point
where it may have little continuing significance"); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich:
Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 507, 508
(2006) ("Gonzales v. Raich marks a watershed moment in the development of judicial
federalism. If it has not quite put an end to the Rehnquist Court's 'federalism revolution,' it
certainly represents an important step in that direction.").
31. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
32. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
33. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
34. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
35. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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I. RICO, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE
Before examining the circuit split, it is necessary to consider the
following: (1) the evolving breadth of RICO applications that permitted
federal prosecutors to charge members of gangs involved in noneconomic
intrastate activity; (2) relevant Commerce Clause cases that bear on the
meaning of RICO's "affecting commerce" language; and (3) the
constitutional avoidance doctrine.
A. The Evolving Breadth of RICO Applications
RICO's origin can be traced back to the 1920s and 1930s, during which a
number of factors including increased narcotic use, Prohibition, and the
Great Depression contributed to the rise of organized crime.36 As crime
grew, prosecutors attempted to dissolve organized crime rings by
prosecuting individual members for discrete crimes; however, this approach
proved largely unsuccessful. 37
As the problem mounted, a series of senatorial and presidential
committees and commissions were formed to analyze organized crime and
to recommend methods of recourse.38 In the 1950s, the Kefauver and
McClellan Committees exposed the structure of the national organized
crime syndicate known as La Cosa Nostra, or the Mafia, and identified as a
primary concern the organization's infiltration of legitimate businesses. 39
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared in an address to Congress
that crime had become "a malignant enemy in America's midst" 40 and
appointed a commission headed by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach
to study the problem.41
Like its predecessor committees, the Katzenbach Commission
emphasized the special problem of organized crime's infiltration of
legitimate businesses. 42  The commission recommended that the
36. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 213, 225-29 (1984) (noting that "prohibition created a need for large-scale
distribution networks comprising smugglers, distillers, bottlers, warehouses and trucks as
well as numerous retailing outlets").
37. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 909
(2005).
38. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 Temp. L.Q.
1009, 1014-15 (1980); Lynch, supra note 8, at 666-73.
39. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 38, at 1014 n.21 (noting that organized crime
infiltrated the automobile, banking, coal, communications, insurance, newspaper, oil, real
estate, steel, television, and transportation industries, among others).
40. Message from the President of the United States Relative to Comments on Crime, Its
Prevalence, and Measures of Prevention, H.R. Doc. No. 103, at 1 (1965).
41. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 666 & n.22.
42. See President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, The Challenge
of Crime in a Free Society 187 (1967) [hereinafter Katzenbach Commission], available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/42.pdf ("[O]rganized crime is... extensively and deeply
involved in legitimate business and in labor unions. Here it employs illegitimate methods-
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government use not only criminal law enforcement but also civil and
regulatory means to curb the expanding problem of organized crime. 43
Specifically, it noted the easier standard of civil, rather than criminal, proof,
the possibility of discovery, and the value of antitrust-type remedies.4
4
These insights paved the way for RICO's combined criminal and civil
approaches.45
Congressional response to the Katzenbach Commission's report was
swift. In 1970, three years after the report was released, the Senate almost
unanimously passed Senate Bill 30-the immediate precursor to RICO.
46
The bill received minor amendments in the House and was signed by the
President into law. 47 Both the legislative history48 and the congressional
findings49 accompanying the Act reflect Congress's preoccupation with the
negative economic effects of criminal infiltration into legitimate businesses.
Accordingly, some scholars claim that eliminating such infiltration was the
Act's sole purpose.50 Others, however, point to changes in the bill's
language and title, as well as broader statements of purpose in the Act's
legislative history, to support the claim that RICO was intended to have a
much broader scope. 51
monopolization, terrorism, extortion, tax evasion-to drive out or control lawful ownership
and leadership and to exact illegal profits from the public.").
43. See id. at 208.
44. See id.; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 38, at 1015 n.25.
45. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 38, at 1015 n.25.
46. See id. at 1019-21. Senate Bill 30 was largely the result of collaboration between
Senators John L. McClellan (D-AR) and Roman Hruska (R-NE). See Lynch, supra note 8, at
673-80. Senator McClellan, introducing the bill to the Senate, remarked, "The problem,
simply stated, is that organized crime is increasingly taking over organizations in our
country .... This bill is designed to attack the infiltration of legitimate business repeatedly
outlined by investigations of various congressional committees and the President's Crime
Commission." 115 Cong. Rec. 9566, 9567 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan). The
Senate subsequently passed the bill by a vote of 73-1. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 38, at
1019 n.61.
47. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 38, at 1020-21.
48. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4033
(noting that § 1962 of RICO establishes a "threefold prohibition aimed at stopping the
infiltration of racketeers into legitimate organizations").
49. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(84 Stat. 922) 1073, 1073 (noting that organized crime had "weaken[ed] the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm[ed] innocent investors and competing organizations,
interfere[d] with free competition, seriously burden[ed] interstate and foreign commerce,
[and] threaten[ed] the domestic security").
50. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 8, at 680 ("[N]owhere in the legislative history is there
even a glimmer of an indication that RICO or any of its predecessors was intended to impose
additional criminal sanctions on racketeering acts that did not involve infiltration into
legitimate business."); Smith, supra note 37, at 909-10 (noting that both the language and
structure of § 1962 evince RICO's purpose to protect enterprises from criminal infiltration).
51. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, supra note 38, at 1025 n.91 (claiming that the title's
change to "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" implies a double aim, that is, to
eliminate infiltrated (racketeer influenced) businesses on the one hand, and wholly
illegitimate (corrupt) organizations on the other). G. Robert Blakey and Brian Gettings also
point to the broad statement of congressional purpose included with RICO. See id. at 1026
n.91. As that statement reads, RICO's purpose is "to seek the eradication of organized crime
2008] 2081
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The Act's plain language lent itself to broad application. The substance
of RICO's criminal component appears in 18 U.S.C. § 1962. That section
creates four new crimes: (1) using income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise, 52 (2) acquiring
or maintaining an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity,53 (3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, 54 and (4) conspiring to commit any of these
offenses. 55 Each of the four subsections contains a federal jurisdictional
hook that requires the enterprise to have engaged in or affected interstate
commerce.
56
When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, it specified that the Act should be
"liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose. ' 57 By liberally
construing such terms as "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity,"
one could argue that the Act's text criminalizes not only infiltrations but
also noninfiltrations. 58 During the 1970s," federal prosecutors learned that
limiting RICO prosecutions to infiltrations of legitimate businesses left
criminals free to engage in purely criminal endeavors.59 As the decade
drew to a close, the U.S. Department of Justice started prosecuting
noninfiltrations under RICO in an effort to broaden its scope. 60
In 1981, the Supreme Court explicitly approved the expansion of RICO
to noninfiltrations. In United States v. Turkette,61 the Court held that a
RICO "enterprise" may be a wholly illegitimate organization. 62 It departed
from the infiltration focus in the Act's legislative history63 and embraced a
broader reading because, as the Court said, "[a]pplying [RICO] also to
criminal organizations does not render any portion of the statute
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies
to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 922) 1073, 1073.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
53. Id. § 1962(b).
54. Id. § 1962(c). For the text of § 1962(c), the section of RICO most relevant to the
circuit split at issue in this Note, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
55. Id. § 1962(d).
56. See supra notes 52-55.
57. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968).
58. "Enterprise" is defined as any "group of individuals associated in fact," 18 U.S.C. §
1961(4), and "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined as the commission of at least two of
a variety of crimes such as murder, bribery, extortion, or drug dealing. Id. § 1961(5); see
also id. § 1961(1)(A).
59. See Smith, supra note 37, at 910-11.
60. See Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice,
43 Vand. L. Rev. 651, 653 (1990).
61. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
62. See id. at 593.
63. See id. ("The language of the statute... reveals that Congress opted for a far broader
definition of the word 'enterprise,' and we are unconvinced by anything in the legislative
history that this definition should be given less than its full effect.").
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superfluous nor does it create any structural incongruities within the
framework of the Act."64
Turkette also demonstrated that the Court was willing to relax standards
of proof concerning the "organized" nature of the "enterprise." The
evidence suggested that Novia Turkette, Jr.'s "enterprise" was far from an
"organization" in the traditional sense, but rather it was a collection of
small-time criminals with whom he occasionally committed robberies or
arson. 65 This is another important development, for it suggests that federal
prosecutors can gain jurisdiction over otherwise state law crimes if they can
demonstrate even a tenuous connection between or among the criminal
participants.
From a law enforcement standpoint, prosecuting criminals in federal
court under RICO instead of deferring to state prosecutions provided three
distinct practical benefits. First, it placed criminal prosecutions in more
able hands. Federal prosecutors are often better able to prosecute organized
crime because they can conduct organized crime investigations more
quickly and win more convictions than state and local authorities. 66
Second, it enabled the joining of crimes that otherwise could not have been
joined in the same indictment. Courts have held that in RICO indictments,
where all defendants are alleged to have participated in the same underlying
pattern of racketeering, there is no misjoinder of defendants under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b). 67 Third, it provided a wider range of
available penalties. A defendant charged with violating RICO may be
sentenced for each of his predicate acts, meaning the substantive crimes that
were committed to acquire or maintain interest in the enterprise or conduct
the affairs of the enterprise. 68 But, in addition, a defendant faces a twenty-
year maximum sentence for a RICO violation and up to twenty additional
years if the government can prove there was a conspiracy under RICO. 69
RICO also provides for massive fines and for mandatory forfeiture of any
64. Id. at 587.
65. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 705.
66. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:
Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 Hastings L.J. 1095, 1125-26 (1995) (attributing such
success to federal prosecutors' ability to "use uncorroborated accomplice testimony," "use
the powers of the federal grand jury, unburdened by a no-hearsay rule," "demand testimony
in exchange for use-and-derivative-use immunity," and take advantage of "cooperation
incentives created by the Sentencing Guidelines").
67. See, e.g., United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975). Rule 8(b) reads, "The indictment or
information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the
same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense
or offenses." Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Thus, defendants that have committed different
predicate acts may still be joined in the same RICO indictment because they participated in
the same "series of acts." See Bright, 630 F.2d at 812-13.
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)-(c) (2000).
69. See id. §§ 1962(d), 1963(a); see also Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 15, at 169
(discussing further the penalties under RICO).
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portion of the defendant's property that can be traced to the proceeds of the
racketeering activity.70
Turkette sparked an expansion of RICO prosecutions. The first wave of
expansion extended RICO into the areas of government and corporate
corruption. 71  For instance, during the 1980s, federal prosecutors used
RICO to prosecute corrupt corporate officers, 72 state officials, 73 and
judges.74 A second wave saw prosecutors use RICO to prosecute violent
gangs. Until the late 1980s, murder was rarely prosecuted in federal
court,75 but since then federal prosecutors have used RICO to bring down
murderous motorcycle gangs, 76 white supremacist groups, 77 and ethnic
street gangs,78 among others.
In the overwhelming majority of these cases, RICO's commerce
requirement was easily satisfied. Corrupt officials exploited their positions
of power to collect illicit profits-often through bribes 79-and were thus
engaged either in interstate commerce or intrastate economic activity that
affected interstate commerce. Likewise, violent gangs were usually
engaged in some kind of interstate activity such as trafficking drugs, 80
organizing gambling, 81 peddling cigarettes, 82 or instigating credit fraud.83
Other gangs were not actually engaged in interstate commerce, but instead
committed intrastate acts of violence. 84  To satisfy RICO, only the
enterprise-not the violent acts themselves-must affect interstate
commerce; thus, federal prosecutors were able to gain jurisdiction over
these cases simply because the violent acts furthered the gangs' goals.85
70. See Jacobs & Gouldin, supra note 15, at 169.
71. One survey of criminal RICO cases from 1974 to 1985 reported that thirty percent
involved government corruption. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 734-35. Another survey, this
one of RICO prosecutions from 1970 to 1996, noted that forty-eight percent involved white-
collar crime, including government corruption, general fraud in the private sector, and
securities and commodities fraud. See G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, Civil and
Criminal RICO: An Overview of the Statute and Its Operation, 64 Def. Couns. J. 36, 43
(1997).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1982).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Devine, 787 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1986).
75. See Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 66, at 1102.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Thai,
29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994).
79. See, e.g., Devine, 787 F.2d at 1087; United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 535 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1980).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1996).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444 (6th Cir. 1996).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897 (6th Cir. 1998).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzeno, 123 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000) (involving a RICO
prosecution where the predicate act was murder); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d
Cir. 1997) (same).
85. See United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 984 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Courts considering the convictions of such gangs' members had held that
the enterprise needed only to have had a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce. 86 Those cases, however, shared a common thread: the gangs
had an economic motive. 87 Given both this case law and RICO's distinctly
economic legislative history, some subsequent cases held that noneconomic
enterprises were exempted from RICO. 88 These cases emphasized a return
to RICO's more modest origins. 89 A 1994 civil RICO case handed down
by the Supreme Court, however, authorized the expansion of RICO to
noneconomic enterprises. 90
During the era of criminal RICO expansion, civil RICO enjoyed a
significant expansion of its own.91 Until 1994, however, these expansions
generally occurred in separate lines of cases. 92
National Organization of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler93 marked an
important bifocal expansion of both civil and criminal RICO. In Scheidler,
a women's rights organization and various abortion clinics brought a civil
86. See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 984 (9th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d
1518, 1526 (lth Cir. 1996) (noting "only a slight effect on interstate commerce is
required").
87. See, e.g., Shryock, 342 F.3d at 984 n.6; Riddle, 249 F.3d at 537.
88. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 629 (7th Cir. 1992),
rev 'd, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) ("We do not believe that requiring an economic motive will place
undue limitations upon RICO actions."); United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("For purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed toward an economic
goal."); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[I]n our view the conduct...
did not constitute an offense ... because ... it was neither claimed nor shown to have any
mercenary motive.").
89. See, e.g., Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63 ("RICO is the lineal descendant of a pair of 1967
Senate bills designed to apply antitrust-type measures to the problem of 'black money'.
Although the bill ultimately enacted as RICO went somewhat beyond this initial conception,
preventing and reversing the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime
elements remained its core purpose."). Regardless, the U.S. Department of Justice continued
to prosecute participants in noneconomic enterprises, consistent with the 1984 revisions to
its formal guidelines. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 261 (noting that the U.S. Attorneys' Manual
was changed from requiring that enterprises prosecuted under RICO be directed toward "an
economic goal" to requiring that they be directed toward "an economic or otherwise
identifiable goal").
90. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 252.
91. The central civil RICO provisions appear in § 1964. That section permits "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" of RICO
to bring a civil suit in federal court against the RICO offender. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
Section 1964(c) provides for monetary recovery (three times the damages sustained and the
cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees), and § 1964(a) provides for equitable
remedies (including divestiture of an interest in an enterprise, restrictions on future activities
or investments, and dissolution or reorganization of an enterprise). See id. § 1964(a), (c).
This powerful remedial tool has become a corporate weapon against labor unions, a device
to sue health maintenance organizations for health care fraud, and a last resort for victims of
police misconduct. See Bagley, supra note 13, at 947-53.
92. For instance, Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), functioned as the
civil analog to the Turkette case. It recognized that although Congress may have intended
civil RICO to be used against criminally infiltrated businesses, it may also be used against
noninfiltrated businesses in everyday fraud cases. See id. at 499-500.
93. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
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RICO action against a coalition of antiabortion groups that allegedly used
extortion in an effort to shut down the abortion clinics. 94 Although the
antiabortion coalition neither sought nor gained any financial benefit from
its actions, the Court held that the predicate acts had the requisite effect on
interstate commerce. 95 The Court held that the word "enterprise" in §
1962(c) of RICO did not require an underlying economic motivation and,
so long as the enterprise satisfied the commerce element, it met RICO's
requirements. 96
After Scheidler, enterprises that were once seemingly immune to federal
prosecution under RICO's language and context became plausible targets
for RICO prosecutions. Scheidler did not, however, specify the precise
effect upon interstate commerce necessary to satisfy RICO. The only
guidance that the Waucaush and Nascimento courts had at their disposal
were earlier cases holding that RICO was satisfied when gangs involved in
economic activity minimally affected interstate commerce. 97 Waucaush
and Nascimento, however, presented a new question: does the de minimis
standard apply to gangs of the noneconomic intrastate variety?
B. Supreme Court Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The conflict between the First Circuit in Nascimento and the Sixth
Circuit in Waucaush centered on the required effect on interstate commerce.
The Nascimento court held that to satisfy § 1962(c) of RICO, prosecutors
need only show a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. 98 Waucaush,
however, held that prosecutors need to show a substantial effect. 99 In
Nascimento, the First Circuit based its opinion in large part on the Supreme
Court's holding in Gonzales v. Raich.100 In order to evaluate Nascimento, it
is necessary to place Raich into context and consider it in light of preceding
Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases.
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to "regulate
commerce ... among the several states."101 The Supreme Court, however,
has struggled with pinpointing exactly how far congressional commerce
power extends. 102 Scholars generally recognize at least three distinct eras
94. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 252-53.
95. See id. at 260.
96. See id. at 258-61.
97. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
98. See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[T]he normal
requirements of the RICO statute apply to defendants involved with enterprises that are
engaged only in noneconomic criminal activity.").
99. See Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[W]here the
enterprise itself did not engage in economic activity, a minimal effect on commerce will not
do.").
100. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 40-43.
101. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
102. See Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 605, 605 (2001); see
also Boris I. Bittker, Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce § 1.01, at
1-6 (1999).
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of Commerce Clause jurisprudence: (1) pre-New Deal narrow
interpretation, (2) 1937 to 1995 broad interpretation, and (3) post-1995 New
Federalism. 10 3 Gonzales v. Raich, decided in 2005, may signal an end to
the most recent era of narrow interpretation and a return to more expansive
congressional commerce power, but it may be too early to make such a
definitive statement. 104
The Court first identified the purpose and scope of the Commerce Clause
in Gibbons v. Ogden. 0 5 Relying upon a fairly narrow interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, 106 the Court held that interstate commerce does not
include activity that is "carried on between man and man in a State, or
between different parts of the same State, and ... does not extend to or
affect other States."' 1 7 Using this definition as a basis, the Court developed
and employed two tests to strike down much Commerce Clause-based
legislation before 1937: the production/commerce test and the
direct/indirect test. Under the first test, the Court struck down legislation
regulating "production-such as manufacturing, agriculture, or mining" and
upheld legislation regulating "commerce or trade in the things
produced."' 1 8  Under the latter test, the Court struck down statutes that
regulated intrastate transactions whose effect upon interstate commerce was
indirect.109
In 1937, the Court broadened its interpretation of the Commerce Clause
and adopted a very lenient rational basis standard for reviewing Commerce
103. See, e.g., Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual
Federalism, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1847, 1853 (2007).
104. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
105. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons involved competing monopoly rights over
interstate steamboat operations between a state-licensed ferry and a ferry licensed by a
congressional act. See id. at 1-2. The Court held that the congressional act was valid and
trumped the state license. See id. at 190-93.
106. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 30, at 510 ("The 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden, often
used to justify an expansive commerce power, in fact relies on a very narrow definition of
interstate commerce." (citation omitted)).
107. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194. For competing interpretations of this portion of
Gibbons, compare Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-4, at 232 (1978)
(claiming that the opinion stood for the proposition that Congress could regulate all activity
having any interstate impact, no matter how indirect), with Richard A. Epstein, The Proper
Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1401-08 (1987) (arguing that the Court
wanted only to refute the argument that interstate commerce can only take place on the
narrow boundary between the two states).
108. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 101, 129 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). This test was first posited in
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (invalidating antitrust regulations on
sugar refining), and was subsequently used to strike down major legislation in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (involving federal child labor laws), and Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (involving minimum wage and maximum hours laws for coal
miners).
109. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935)
("In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate
transactions upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and
well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects.").
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Clause-based legislation.1 10 This shift from narrow to broad interpretation
is often attributed to the emergence of the popular idea that national
economic problems demanded a federal legislative response and that the
judiciary should permit such critical legislation under the Commerce
Clause, regardless of how tenuous the connection to interstate commerce
may be. I1 ' This more deferential approach to Commerce Clause-based
legislation endured long after the New Deal thanks to the Court's new
substantial effects test. 112 With each new major Commerce Clause case,
the Court refined this test, permitting regulation over both private
activities 113 and activities that indirectly impacted commerce. 114
The Court debuted the substantial effects test in 1937. In rejecting its
prior exclusion of intrastate manufacturing from the scope of congressional
commerce power, the Court held that intrastate activities are within the
scope of the Commerce Clause so long as they "have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions." 115
The Court later held that Congress could choose the means reasonably
adapted to attain the desired interstate regulation, even if those means
amounted to regulation of intrastate activities. 116 In 1942, the Court started
aggregating discrete intrastate activities to bring them within the ambit of
the substantial effects test.1 17 In other words, the Court held that Congress
could prohibit individual farmers from growing wheat for home
110. See Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act
Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 375, 384 (2007).
111. See Epstein, supra note 107, at 1443. In addition, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
threatened to "pack" the Court with justices more sympathetic to New Deal legislation.
Matthew Perry, Justice Stone and Footnote 4, 6 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 35, 39 (1996).
The plan was abandoned when a new and dominant liberal voting bloc emerged on the
Court, thanks to Justice Owen J. Robert's "switch in time that saved the nine." See id. at 39-
40, 54-55.
112. See Arthur B. Mark III, United States v. Morrison, the Commerce Clause and the
Substantial Effects Test: No Substantial Limit on Federal Power, 34 Creighton L. Rev. 675,
675 (2001).
113. See id. at 675.
114. See Mank, supra note 110, at 384.
115. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (upholding a
congressional act that provided for collective bargaining based upon its potential to promote
industrial peace and productivity).
116. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which promoted labor standards by prohibiting the interstate shipment of
goods produced under substandard labor conditions). Professor Gerald Gunther calls this the
"super-bootstrap" technique. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 188-89 (9th ed. 1975).
As applied in Darby, to attain the end of regulating interstate commerce, Congress may
prohibit interstate shipments; and to attain the prohibition of interstate shipments, Congress
may regulate the labor standards and local minimum wage because they drive up prices.
According to the Court, "The requirement for [employment] records even of the intrastate
transaction is an appropriate means to a legitimate end." Darby, 312 U.S. at 125.
117. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (upholding the
constitutionality of wheat production quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (2000)).
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consumption because that activity in the aggregate would substantially
affect interstate commerce. 118
Although the period of Commerce Clause jurisprudence from 1937 to
1995 is most widely recognized for the development of the Court's
3ubstantial effects test, it produced another jurisprudential development
that, for the purposes of this Note, is perhaps more important than the
substantial effects test. In its later cases during this period, the Court
developed a comprehensive regulatory scheme rationale to justify
regulation of intrastate activities. Considered together, the major
substantial effects test cases stand for the principle that Congress may
regulate intrastate activity if it has a rational basis for concluding that the
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 119 The comprehensive
scheme rationale is a practical extension of the substantial effects test. For
example, under this rationale, the Court permitted Congress to extend the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act to the states and thus regulate local
employers. 120 Although the employers' activities, taken individually, did
not affect interstate commerce, the cumulative effect of withholding
application to all local employers would undermine the efficacy of the
federal regulatory program. 121  Thus, Congress, the Court held, may
regulate a "class of activities" that significantly affects interstate commerce,
even if the class includes at least some intrastate activities that do not.122
According to the Court,
A complex regulatory program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause
challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is
independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is
enough that the challenged provisions are an integral part of the
regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a
whole satisfies this test. 123
Both the substantial effects test and the comprehensive scheme rationale
have found their way into modern Supreme Court Commerce Clause
jurisprudence-though in very different ways. In the late 1990s, the
Rehnquist Court turned the substantial effects test on its head, using
portions of earlier cases to narrow, rather than broaden, congressional
commerce power. 124 It struck down legislation that strayed too far from the
Commerce Clause and returned a great deal of power to the states in the
118. See id. That is, homegrown wheat consumption by "many others similarly situated"
would reduce the demand for and price of wheat in the national market. Id. at 128.
119. See Mank, supra note 110, at 384-87 (referring to NLRB, Darby, and Wickard).
120. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 189-90 (1968); see also Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
121. See id. at 192-93.
122. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152-55 (1971).
123. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995) ("Jones & Laughlin
Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence .... But
even these modem-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.").
2008] 2089
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
name of New Federalism. 125 In 2005, however, the Court departed from its
stricter analysis of Commerce Clause-based legislation and adopted the
comprehensive scheme approach to uphold federal drug legislation that
regulated intrastate marijuana use and cultivation.126
The two Rehnquist Court cases that mark the third era of Supreme Court
Commerce Clause jurisprudence are United States v. Lopez 127 and United
States v. Morrison.128 In those cases, the Court struck down, respectively,
federal legislation prohibiting gun possession in school zones 129 and an act
that provided a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
violence. 130
Using the substantial effects test, the Court struck down the legislation as
straying too far from the spirit of the Commerce Clause. It noted that
neither the actors that the legislation at issue regulated, nor their conduct,
had a commercial character. 131 Thus, as Chief Justice William Rehnquist
noted, the legislation could not be sustained under "cases upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce." 132  The Court, driven by a professed respect for traditional
state authority, emphasized the need to distinguish between what is truly
national and truly local. 133
In striking down both pieces of legislation, however, the Court did not
merely rely upon federalism arguments; rather, it set forth a detailed
framework for analyzing the connection of such legislation to the
Commerce Clause. In Lopez, the Court noted that one of the three areas of
valid congressional power under the Commerce Clause is activity having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 134  The Court set forth the
following four-step analysis for legislation governing such activity: (1) Is
the activity described in the statute economic in nature? (2) Does the
statute contain a jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of
action is in pursuance of Congress's commerce power? (3) Are there
congressional findings regarding the effects of the activity upon interstate
commerce? (4) Is the link between the activity and a substantial effect upon
interstate commerce attenuated? 135
125. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the
Rehnquist Court?, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 589, 590 (2006) (noting that the Rehnquist Court
struck down more congressional acts than all previous Supreme Courts combined).
126. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2005).
127. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
128. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
129. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
130. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
131. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. See id. at 561.
133. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
134. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. The other two areas are the channels of interstate
commerce and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See id. at 558.
135. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-67.
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Under that framework, if the congressional statute is noneconomic, the
activity cannot be aggregated to meet the substantial effects test.' 36
Moreover, the connection between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce may be too attenuated to warrant validity. 137 Even if the statute
includes congressional findings describing such a connection, those
findings are not sufficient, by themselves, to rescue the statute from
unconstitutionality. 138
Some have criticized the Lopez-Morrison framework as unworkable, 139
and whether due to that unworkability, the challenges presented by a new
fact pattern, or some combination of the two, the Court abandoned it in
Gonzales v. Raich. Instead, the Court looked to the cases decided between
1937 and 1995 that developed the comprehensive scheme rationale to
uphold the provision of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) that
criminalized intrastate marijuana cultivation and use as an essential part of
the wider regulatory scheme, i.e., the CSA itself. 140
To justify its departure from the Lopez-Morrison framework and its use
of an alternative test, the Court distinguished CSA from the statutes at issue
in Lopez and Morrison on two major grounds. First, it distinguished the
CSA as a comprehensive piece of legislation. It described the act as a
lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework for
regulating the production, distribution, possession, and use of five classes of
controlled substances.'14 Secondly, the Court distinguished the CSA as a
"quintessentially economic" statute. 142  The Court, which in Lopez
restricted Congress's Commerce Clause power to only "economic"
activities, 143  here defined "economic" as anything involving "the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities."' 144 It described
the CSA as just that kind of statute: a regulation over "the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an
established, and lucrative, interstate market." 145 The statutes at issue in
136. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
137. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The link may be too attenuated if it would require one
to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States." Id.
138. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
139. See, e.g., Dral & Phillips, supra note 102, at 616-17; Mank, supra note 110, at 402-
03; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-
Revolution?, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 879, 895 (2005).
140. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2005). The Controlled Substances Act
criminalizes several other drugs as well, including heroin, cocaine, PCP, and LSD. See 21
U.S.C. § 84 1(a), (b) (2000).
141. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 24. The Court, however, did not specify how to distinguish
comprehensive from noncomprehensive statutes.
142. Id. at 25.
143. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
144. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id. at 26. The Court likened the case to Wickard v. Filburn, noting that both the
CSA and wheat production regulations at issue in Wickard sought to control the supply and
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Lopez and Morrison, however, were neither comprehensive nor
economic. 146
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, however, criticized the majority's
definition of "economic" as excessively broad.' 47 She warned that the
Court's adoption of the definition would upset the newly restored federal-
state balance and undo the Court's work in Lopez and Morrison. The broad
definition, she claimed, "threatens to sweep all of productive human
activity into federal regulatory reach."' 48  Consequentially, it provides
incentives for Congress to overlegislate. 149
The CSA's distinguishing characteristics nonetheless proved dispositive.
The difference was clear: Raich presented a challenge to an individual
application of a concededly valid, decidedly economic, comprehensive
statutory scheme, whereas Lopez and Morrison presented facial challenges
to noneconomic statutes. Given these procedural and legal differences, the
Court opted for the comprehensive scheme approach, which permits it to
uphold regulation over a subdivided class of intrastate activity if such
regulation is essential to ensure the efficacy of a wider, comprehensive
regulatory scheme and if Congress rationally believes that the class of
activity is substantially related to interstate commerce.' 50 The Court held
that regulation of intrastate marijuana cultivation and use was essential to
ensure orderly enforcement of a regulatory scheme designed to regulate the
use of controlled substances for medicinal purposes. 151 Just as nationwide
exemption of home wheat production from federal regulation might disrupt
the interstate wheat market and undermine national production quotas, 152
"nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs)
locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by
friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial impact on
[its] interstate market."1 53
Raich did not overturn Lopez and Morrison; it merely limited those cases
to their factual analogues. 154 It is unclear, however, if Raich signals a
return to broader Commerce Clause interpretation and more lenient review
of federal Commerce Clause-based legislation. Perhaps, as some have
suggested, Raich is a legal aberration whose politically charged facts drove
demand of fungible commodities. See id. at 17-19; see also supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
146. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25.
147. See id. at 49-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 49.
149. Seeid. at 43.
150. See id. at 26-27.
151. Seeid. at 27-29.
152. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
153. Raich, 545 U.S. at 28.
154. See Nolan Mitchell, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and
the Limits of Federal Power over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 691, 733 (2006). But see
United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 620-34 (10th Cir. 2006) (using an integrated
Commerce Clause approach that combines Raich's test with Lopez's analytical framework).
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the Court to an unlikely decision. 155 Regardless, federal courts may soon
face questions regarding Raich's comprehensive scheme test. Raich has left
behind various unresolved issues, including the majority's potentially
overly broad definition of economic,] 56 and the absence of objective tests
for determining whether a statute is comprehensive and whether a particular
regulatory component is essential to the statute.
C. Constitutional Avoidance
Waucaush used the constitutional avoidance doctrine to give a different
reading to § 1962(c) of RICO when applying the statute to enterprises
engaged in noneconomic intrastate activity.' 57 In contrast, the Nascimento
court argued that Waucaush misapplied that doctrine. 158 To evaluate the
validity of those courts' arguments, it is necessary to review the doctrine's
nature, purpose, and application.
The avoidance doctrine requires federal courts to construe a statute to
avoid rendering it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court first enunciated the
principle in 1909, describing it in the following way:
It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the
statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to
adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional
infirmity. 159
The doctrine is one of many canons of construction that a court may use to
effectuate Congress's intent in enacting a particular statute before it
considers the merits of a constitutional challenge to that statute.1 60
155. The vote to uphold application of the CSA was 6-3. Raich, 545 U.S. 1. Only
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia switched their votes from striking down the
legislation in Lopez and Morrison to upholding application of the CSA in Raich. For
criticism and speculation concerning the switch in voting, see, for example, Editorial,
Federalism, a la Carte, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 2006, at A10 (characterizing the decision as
"results-oriented jurisprudence in federalist drag"); Randy Barnett, The Ninth Circuit's
Revenge, Nat'l Rev. Online, June 9, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/barnett200506090741 .asp (describing Justice
Kennedy as having a "zero-tolerance approach to drugs" and Justice Scalia as concerned
more with majoritarianism than originalism); Ryan Grim, A Guide to Gonzales vs. Raich,
Salon.com, June 7, 2005,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/06/07/supreme-court-and-pot/ (positing that
Scalia faced a dilemma whereby he "had to stick somewhere near his expressed principles,
not piss off Republicans in Congress and the White House-and, of course, make sure there
are no hippies smoking legal marijuana anywhere in his United States").
156. See supra note 144, 147-49 and accompanying text.
157. See Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2004).
158. See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2007).
159. United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407
(1909).
160. See Robert W. Scheef, Temporal Dynamics in Statutory Interpretation: Courts,
Congress, and the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 529, 533 (2003).
2008] 2093
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Underlying courts' use of the doctrine is the assumption that Congress did
not intend to enact an unconstitutional statute. 161
Two major principles drive the courts' continued use of the avoidance
doctrine. The first is judicial self-restraint in constitutional adjudication. 162
Courts are likely to exercise restraint on constitutional issues, as separation
of powers concerns accompany those issues. 163 Whereas appellate courts
have limited fact-finding power and attenuated electoral accountability,
legislatures have better democratic and policy-making pedigree 164 and are
thus better positioned to vindicate constitutional principles. 165 By avoiding
constitutional questions, courts signal their concern for constitutional issues
without risking interbranch conflict. 166 Instead of blindly overturning laws,
they allow Congress and other bodies to respond through new legislation.
167
The second principle underlying courts' use of the avoidance doctrine is
deference to congressional intent. 168  Courts may apply a saving
interpretation to a statute only when it is amenable to such an
interpretation;1 69 that is, courts may not impose an interpretation that is
plainly contrary to Congress's intent, 170 as demonstrated by the statute's
text and legislative history. 17' That said, if a statute's legislative history
actually demonstrates that Congress was aware of and concerned with
potential constitutional problems, the avoidance doctrine might be
superfluous. 172
161. See id. at 532.
162. See id. at 534-40. This phrase is borrowed from Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v.
Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 49, 63. Some, however, have claimed that the avoidance doctrine actually enhances
judicial activism and functionally results in a presumption of unconstitutionality. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816 (1983) (arguing that the doctrine creates a "judge-made constitutional
'penumbra"'); Michelle R. Slack, Avoiding Avoidance: Why Use of the Constitutional
Avoidance Canon Undermines Judicial Independence-A Response to Lisa Kloppenberg, 56
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1057, 1063 (2006) (arguing that the doctrine "creates a protective zone
around possibly unconstitutional interpretations because the court will not get close enough
to the Constitution to tell us how close is too close").
163. See Scheef, supra note 160, at 534-35.
164. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
405,468 (1989).
165. See Scheef, supra note 160, at 535.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 540-48.
169. See id. at 540-41.
170. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001)
(quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
171. See Scheef, supra note 160, at 543.
172. See id. at 548. Even when legislative history is unhelpful, it might be wrong to
apply the avoidance doctrine. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the
Judicial Monopoly on Constitutional Interpretation, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev 481, 488-89
(1990) (criticizing the underlying assumption that Congress always intends to enact a
constitutional statute).
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Of the myriad Supreme Court cases employing the avoidance doctrine,
two are of particular concern to the Waucaush-Nascimento circuit split.
The court in Waucaush cited to Jones v. United States173 in deciding that §
1962(c) of RICO warranted a different reading when applied to enterprises
engaged in noneconomic intrastate activity. 174 The court in Nascimento,
meanwhile, cited to Clark v. Martinez175 to support its claim that Waucaush
misapplied the constitutional avoidance doctrine. 176
In Jones, the Court considered whether a federal arson statute applied to
the arson of a private residence. 177 The relevant part of the statute made it a
crime for one to "damage[] or destroy[], or attempt[] to damage or destroy,
by means of fire or an explosive, any building ... used in interstate or
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce."' 78 The arson statute is contained within the same organized
crime act of which RICO is a part, and its "affecting commerce" language is
analogous to that of § 1962(c). The Court rejected the government's
argument that the private residence that had been set ablaze was "used" in
activities affecting interstate commerce. 179  Such an interpretation
threatened to sweep all arson under federal jurisdiction and render the
statute's commerce-affecting limitation mere "surplusage."'' 80 The Court
thus rejected that reading of the statute as unconstitutional. 181
In Clark, the Court considered a provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) that authorized detention of three different classes of
aliens. 182 In a prior case, the Court had held that the statute implicitly
prohibited indefinite detention of one of those three classes; 183 in Clark, the
government argued that the implicit prohibition did not apply to one of the
other two classes. 184 Rejecting the government's argument, the Court
refused to give the "same detention provision a different meaning when
173. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
174. See Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2004).
175. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
176. See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2007).
177. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 852.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
179. Jones, 529 U.S. at 855 (citing the government's argument that the building was used
(1) as collateral to secure a mortgage, (2) to obtain casualty insurance from an out-of-state
insurer, and (3) to receive natural gas from out-of-state sources).
180. Id. at 857. Jones was decided at the height of the Rehnquist Court's New
Federalism. It is unsurprising, then, that the Court made a federalism argument similar to
that made in Lopez. It noted that arson, like gun possession, is traditionally local criminal
conduct and that federalizing such local conduct raised grave constitutional concerns. See id.
at 858-59.
181. See id. at 859.
182. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005). The provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act that the Court interpreted in Clark is 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2000).
183. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697-99 (2001) (holding that aliens who had
been admitted but were subsequently ordered removed could not be detained indefinitely).
184. See Clark, 543 U.S. at 380. The government claimed that the statutory purpose and
constitutional concerns that influenced Zadvydas did not exist for the class of aliens who
attempted to enter the country, but were deemed inadmissible and subsequently ordered
removed. See id.
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[different] aliens are involved."' 8 5 In applying the avoidance doctrine, the
Court may impose a limiting construction on a statute's language in one
particular application even though other applications of the statute do not
support the same limitation.' 86 But, the Court noted, the "lowest common
denominator" must govern.18 7
This previously unarticulated 188 lowest common denominator rule seems
to require courts to interpret a statute to avoid both actual or present and
potential or future constitutional difficulties and then uniformly apply that
interpretation in subsequent cases even when those later cases do not raise
serious constitutional concerns. 189 The goal, it seems, is to prevent a statute
from becoming a "chameleon" whose meaning is subject to change based
upon the particular constitutional concerns of a given case. 190 Regardless,
the Court noted in Clark, the avoidance doctrine must serve to effectuate
congressional intent.' 9'
The avoidance doctrine is necessary to understand how RICO may be
interpreted differently based upon various accompanying constitutional
concerns. As Part 1.B demonstrated, a statute that includes language
requiring a particular activity to "affect interstate commerce" is informed by
over 150 years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Those cases indicate
that federal Commerce Clause-based legislation often raises constitutional
questions. RICO is no different.
On its face, § 1962(c)'s "affecting commerce" language seems to imply
that the enterprise must simply affect interstate commerce in some
discernible way. The best evidence for this is probably congressional
acquiescence in light of the Court's subsequent expansions of RICO
applications. 192 However, as mere statutory interpretation does not put the
issue to rest, the inquiry does not end with Scheidler. That case was almost
entirely an exercise in strict statutory interpretation. 93  The wider
jurisprudential context calls for a more nuanced analysis. In Lopez and




188. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 169, 386
(2005).
189. See Clark, 543 U.S. at 380-81.
190. See id. at 382. The rule, however, has been criticized as counterintuitive. See, e.g.,
The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 188, at 394 (noting that the rule
requires courts to "confront constitutional issues before they are ripe"); Jonathan R. Siegel,
The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev.
339, 382 (2005) (arguing that the rule "ratchets up the judicial interference with
congressional will").
191. See Clark, 543 U.S. at 382.
192. Many in Congress have viewed the major Supreme Court RICO cases as "judicial
S.O.S. signals," that is, as indications that Congress may need to revise RICO and provide
for greater ease of interpretation. Dennis, supra note 60, at 656. Congress has not, however,
undertaken any such major revisions.
193. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256-59 (1994)
(interpreting § 1962(c) of RICO with little reference to extrastatutory concerns).
2096 [Vol. 76
STREET GANGS AND RICO
permit Congress to regulate behavior that only tenuously affected interstate
co-mmerce. 194 Moreover, the avoidance doctrine compels courts to choose
from among competing statutory interpretations the interpretation that
avoids rendering the statute unconstitutional. 195 However, Raich may also
be read to compel courts to uphold potentially unconstitutional statutory
applications-but only if the comprehensive regulatory scheme approach
kicks in. 196  Waucaush and Nascimento take two different approaches
toward resolving these myriad concerns.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: SATISFYING RICO's
"AFFECTING COMMERCE" REQUIREMENT FOR ENTERPRISES
ENGAGED IN NONECONOMIC INTRASTATE ACTIVITIES
In 2004, the Sixth Circuit held in Waucaush v. United States that
members of noneconomic intrastate enterprises could not be charged under
RICO unless the enterprise substantially affected interstate commerce. 197
Three years later, in United States v. Nascimento, the First Circuit
considered the same question as an issue of first impression. 198 That court
held, contrary to Waucaush, that such enterprises need only have a de
minimis effect upon interstate commerce. 199
A. Waucaush v. United States
The facts of the Waucaush case are very similar to those of Nascimento:
Robert Waucaush was a member of a Detroit-area street gang known as the
"Cash Flow Posse," or the CFP, which, despite its name, did not conduct
any economic activities.20 0 Its purpose, like Nascimento's gang, was to
resist the recruiting efforts of rival gangs.2 0 1 To effect this purpose, gang
members engaged in various acts of violence, including murders, drive-by
shootings, arsons, and assaults.2 02 Waucaush and his colleagues committed
these acts exclusively within Michigan state boundaries.20 3
On July 16, 1997, federal prosecutors handed down an indictment
charging Waucaush and six other members of the CFP with substantive
RICO violations under § 1962(c) and RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d). 20 4
Although the CFP was not engaged in interstate commerce, the indictment
alleged that it was connected to interstate commerce in the following ways:
(1) gang members traveled on an interstate highway to commit murders, (2)
194. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 140-46, 150-53 and accompanying text.
197. See Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 2004)
198. See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2007).
199. See id. at 38.
200. See Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2004).
201. See Brief for the Appellant at 6, Waucaush, 380 F.3d 251 (No. 03-1072).
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 253.
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one of the gang members used a gun that was manufactured outside of
Michigan, (3) other gang members' guns were purchased at a trade center
that frequently did business with out-of-state citizens, (4) a gang member
alluded to the possibility of CFP chapters in other states, and (5) a gang
member acknowledged that other members, while in Mexico, had held a
meeting to discuss the gang's activities. 20 5 Despite the seemingly tenuous
connection, the district court refused Waucaush's motion to dismiss the
indictment.2 06
Waucaush's case was revived, however, thanks to the Supreme Court's
rulings in Jones and Morrison.207 According to the Sixth Circuit, Lopez
sparked a new era in Commerce Clause jurisprudence: it established (1)
that Congress could control intrastate activity only if it substantially
affected interstate commerce, and (2) that courts may not pile inference
upon inference to demonstrate that activities with a tenuous connection to
interstate commerce satisfy the substantial effects test.20 8 Lopez may seem
distinguishable from Waucaush because in Lopez, the government sought to
defend the statute on its potential to curb violence, whereas in Waucaush,
the defendants actually did engage in violence; 209 but Morrison and Jones
demonstrated that Lopez could be extended to remove the CFP's activities
from the sphere of congressional commerce power.
The evidence in Morrison demonstrated that "the economic impact of
actual gender-motivated violence was far more direct and apparent than that
of mere possession of a weapon near a school [in Lopez]. '210 Thus, even
though the economic impact of the CFP's activities were more direct than
the activities in Lopez, the rule set forth in Lopez would still govern. 211
Jones had a similar broadening effect on Lopez's application: "Because
losing one's house has obvious commercial effects, the refusal to
distinguish Lopez [from Jones] on that basis indicated that Lopez would be
read broadly." 212
Lopez, Morrison, and Jones were not the only important cases bearing on
Waucaush. Three prior Sixth Circuit cases set the stage for Waucaush's
rejection of the de minimis test. In United States v. Smith,213 the Sixth
Circuit held that, even though Lopez necessitated a substantial effect on
205. See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 201, at 6-7.
206. See Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 253.
207. Robert Waucaush pled guilty to the RICO conspiracy count in May 1998, but moved
to withdraw his plea the next month. See id. at 253. The district court denied his motion and
in March 1999 sentenced him to life in prison. See id. at 253-54. Over a year later, the
Morrison and Jones decisions prompted the district court to dismiss charges against a fellow
Cash Flow Posse member who was awaiting sentencing. See id. at 254. Waucaush, relying
on Morrison and Jones, collaterally challenged his own conviction, and the case moved to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See id.
208. See id. at 261; see also supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.




213. 182 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 1999).
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interstate commerce, the de minimis standard survived Lopez as applied to
the Hobbs Act-a close statutory cousin of RICO.2 14 The defendant in
Smith was convicted of robbing a number of party stores. 215 He claimed
that the government failed to prove the nexus between the robberies and
interstate commerce. 216  The court, however, upheld Quintus Smith's
conviction because the stores that he robbed had purchased a substantial
quantity of beer, wine, and tobacco products from out of state.217 Applying
the aggregation principle, the court noted that de minimis interferences with
those businesses, in the aggregate, substantially affected commerce. 218
In United States v. Wang,219 the Sixth Circuit considered another Hobbs
Act conviction, but unlike Smith the defendant in Wang was convicted of
robbing a married couple in their home. 220 The court again recognized that
the de minimis test survived Lopez,221 but it overturned the defendant's
conviction in this case.222 It invoked Lopez's and Morrison's admonitions
about extending congressional commerce power to regulations on
noneconomic intrastate violence. 223 Ultimately, the government here failed
to demonstrate that the robbery of a small amount of money from a private
residence had an impact that, if aggregated, would substantially affect
interstate commerce. 224
In United States v. Riddle,225 the court directly addressed the application
of the de minimis test to RICO. The defendant in Riddle was involved in an
illegal gambling enterprise in Ohio that extorted money from out-of-state
businessmen and protected against gambling losses by purchasing out-of-
state lottery tickets. 226 The court once again held that the de minimis test
survived as applied to RICO and that the government easily satisfied that
test.
227
214. See id. at 456. The Hobbs Act, commonly known as the federal extortion law,
criminalizes actual and attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign
commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000). It also proscribes conspiracy to commit robbery or
extortion. See id. Civil RICO litigants often use RICO and the Hobbs Act in conjunction
when presenting their claims to the court. For example, in Scheidler v. National
Organization for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 14 (2006), the respondents brought an action
under RICO asserting that the petitioners had engaged in physically violent antiabortion
activities that were intended to interfere with abortion clinics, and that these activities
violated RICO because they amounted to extortion under the Hobbs Act.
215. See Smith, 182 F.3d at 455.
216. See id.
217. See id. at456.
218. See id.; see also supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
219. 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000).
220. See id. at 236.
221. See id. at 238.
222. See id. at 240.
223. See id. at 238-40.
224. See id.
225. 249 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2001).




Waucaush argued that Smith, Wang, and Riddle demonstrate that the
issue is not whether the de minimis test applies, but rather how the test is
applied in different contexts. 228 The difference between Smith and Wang,
Waucaush claimed, is much like the difference between Riddle and his own
case. 229 The Sixth Circuit agreed and refused to extend the de minimis test
from Riddle to Waucaush. It noted that "a minimal connection sufficed in
Riddle only because the enterprise itself had engaged in economic
activity." 230 Although other circuits had adopted the de minimis test for
RICO, the Sixth Circuit dismissed those cases as involving illegal economic
activities, such as drug trafficking and extortion. 231 In Waucaush, all that
was left was "violence qua violence-which the Supreme Court in
Morrison plainly classified as conduct of the noneconomic strain." 232 The
court went on:
At the end of the day, we are left with an enterprise whose activity was
intrastate, noneconomic, and without substantial effects on interstate
commerce. The CFP's violent enterprise surely affected interstate
commerce in some way-a corpse cannot shop, after all. But we may not
"follow the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent
crime.. . to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce." 233
Once the court made this important distinction, it employed the
constitutional avoidance doctrine to create a substantial effects test for
RICO.2 34 Jones required courts to avoid interpreting statutes to prohibit
conduct that Congress may not constitutionally regulate, and since RICO's
"affecting interstate commerce" requirement may not exceed the bounds of
the Commerce Clause, Congress may only regulate noneconomic intrastate
activities under RICO if they have a substantial effect on commerce. 235 As
the court said, "where the enterprise itself did not engage in economic
activity, a minimal effect on commerce will not do." 236
B. United States v. Nascimento
Nascimento's gang, "Stonehurst," was a collection of thugs in the Boston
area who organized themselves for the purpose of shooting and killing rival
gang members. 237 Like the CFP, Stonehurst was neither engaged in
228. See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 201, at 18.
229. See id.
230. Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2004).
231. See id. at 255-56. The cases the Sixth Circuit declined to follow include United
States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948
(9th Cir. 2003); and United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000).
232. Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 256.
233. Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000)).
234. See id. at 255-56. Although the Sixth Circuit does not explicitly state that it is
employing the avoidance doctrine, that is the clear implication.
235. See id. at 255.
236. Id. at 256.
237. See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 30 & n.1 (lst Cir. 2007).
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interstate commerce nor driven by an underlying economic motive.238 The
government, however, claimed that Stonehurst's activities affected
interstate commerce. It offered as its most "loudly bruited" piece of
evidence that a murder committed by a Stonehurst gang member inside a
twenty-four-hour tire shop caused the shop to temporarily close.239
Nascimento claimed that the government lacked evidence that the
temporary closing actually affected commerce. 240 In fact, the owner of the
shop had testified that there was no way for him to know whether customers
were turned away by the shooting. 241 Moreover, the tire shop was the only
twenty-four-hour shop in Boston, and since it was closed for only a few
hours after midnight, it was likely that any potential customers simply
waited until the shop reopened in the morning. 242
The First Circuit, however, focused on a different point raised by the
government: at least eight guns seized from Stonehurst members had been
manufactured out-of-state, and at least one had been purchased out-of-
state. 243 Nascimento claimed that the guns demonstrated a mere tenuous
connection with interstate commerce rather than an actual detrimental effect
on such commerce. 244 The court rejected this argument. Referring to the
purchase of the weapon outside the state, it noted that "crossing state lines
for [the] purpose of engaging in a commercial transaction is a paradigmatic
example of an activity that falls within the compass of the commerce
power."245 The court thus concluded that Stonehurst's activities had a de
minimis effect upon interstate commerce. 246 There remained, however, the
more important question of whether a de minimis effect was sufficient to
satisfy RICO.
Nascimento argued that the First Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit in
Waucaush, should require the government to demonstrate a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 247 The First Circuit had held in United
States v. Marino248 that a de minimis effect was sufficient. 249 There the
court cited the Sixth Circuit holding in Riddle for support, presumably
because the enterprise in Marino-as in Riddle-was engaged in economic
activity.250 The defendant in Marino was a member of an organized crime
family that collected extortion payments and controlled a cocaine
distribution ring. 251 Nascimento argued that the First Circuit should depart
238. See id.
239. Id. at 43-44; see also Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 17.
240. See Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 32-33.
241. See id. at 33.
242. See id.
243. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 45.
244. See Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 30.
245. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 45.
246. See id. at 43-45.
247. See Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 24-28.
248. 277 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002).
249. See id. at 35.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 19-21.
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from its holding in Marino for the same reason that the Sixth Circuit
departed from Riddle in Waucaush.252
The government encouraged the First Circuit to dismiss Waucaush as
flawed.253 It contended that Lopez and Morrison may not be used to alter
the burden of proof for RICO's jurisdictional element. 2 54  The
constitutional inquiry as to whether a given regulation over intrastate
activity falls within the ambit of congressional commerce power is
qualitatively different from the more limited statutory and evidentiary
inquiry into whether the government met its burden to prove, in a given
prosecution, that the enterprise's activities affected interstate commerce-
an inquiry that depends exclusively on the adjudicative facts presented at
trial. Thus, Waucaush needlessly conflates a constitutional test with an
evidentiary one.255
The government's argument, it appears, was that analysis under the Lopez-
Morrison framework was unnecessary because the core issue presented by
the case did not implicate such constitutional questions. Instead, they
argued, the core issue was the government's burden of proof. If that were
the case, the issue could presumably be resolved without reference to the
Court's long line of Commerce Clause cases.
Nascimento rebutted that argument, claiming that it misconstrued
Lopez's analytical framework and ignored the Court's holding in Jones.256
In Jones, the Supreme Court used Lopez to interpret the scope of the federal
arson statute and determine whether the government's evidence concerning
the connection to interstate commerce was sufficient to support a conviction
thereunder. 257 That case, Nascimento claimed, made it clear that Lopez was
not only relevant in determining an act"s facial constitutionality, but also in
ensuring that statutes were interpreted in a manner that avoided potential
unconstitutionality. 258
Nascimento's rebuttal finds support in a First Circuit case from 2004. In
United States v. Morales-de Jestis,259 the court noted that a defendant may
raise a valid as-applied challenge to a statute with an interstate commerce
requirement if the facts of the case raise "concerns that the conduct at issue,
although covered by the language of the statute, was not within the sphere
of activity identified by Congress as the basis for its exercise of power
under the Commerce Clause." 260 Applying this argument to the facts of
Nascimento, a court may determine that Stonehurst's acts were not within
the sphere of activity that Congress identified as RICO's basis. Thus, a
252. See Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 25-26.
253. See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 62.
254. See id. at 63 (citing United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1997)).
255. Id. at 63 (citation omitted).
256. See Reply Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 2, United States v. Nascimento, 491
F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1152).
257. See id.; see also supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
258. See Reply Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 256, at 3-4.
259. 372 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
260. Id. at 18.
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court may refuse to read RICO as encompassing noneconomic activities
that have only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce.
Ultimately, the First Circuit refused to follow Waucaush.261 Its rationale
was twofold: (1) disapproval of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Waucaush,262
and (2) reliance on post-Waucaush Supreme Court precedent in Raich.263
The First Circuit criticized the Waucaush court for misconstruing the
constitutional avoidance doctrine. 264 It characterized Waucaush as reading
the phrase "affecting commerce" to require prosecutors to prove different
things in different situations. 265 The court found nothing in § 1962(c)'s
language and legislative history to suggest that those words were intended
to be dependent on factual application. 266
The court dismissed the paltry discussion of the avoidance doctrine in
Waucaush,267 and offered its own version of the canon. For support, it cited
to the Clark case, decided after both Waucaush and Jones.268 Clark, it
noted, specified that the avoidance doctrine does not give alternative
meanings to statutory phrases in cases where its applicability might raise
constitutional questions.269 Pointing to the lowest common denominator
test, the court interpreted Clark to require "a single definition for a phrase
that is then applied even in cases in which a broader reading would not be
constitutionally dubious." 270  That single definition was provided in
Marino, where the First Circuit defined the word "affecting" in the RICO
context as requiring "only some effect on interstate commerce." 271 The
case law, then, left no room for efforts at constitutional avoidance. 272
The court claimed that this argument was consistent with Jones.273 In
Jones, it noted, the Court defined the word "used" as "active
employment. ' 274 Instead of giving that language of the federal arson statute
261. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 38.
262. See infra notes 264-75 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 276-87 and accompanying text.
264. See id. at 38.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 37 ("[Blasic principles of statutory construction... counsel[] persuasively
against a court trying to tease from the simple word 'affect' sophisticated gradations of
meaning that will vary from situation to situation.").
267. See id. at 38. Although Waucaush discusses Jones at length, the opinion includes a
mere sentence describing the court's understanding of the avoidance doctrine. See Waucaush
v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Because we should avoid interpreting a
statute to prohibit conduct which Congress may not constitutionally regulate, RICO's
meaning of 'affect[ing] interstate or foreign commerce' cannot exceed the bounds of the
Commerce Clause.").
268. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 38.
269. See id.
270. Id.
271. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 35 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
272. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 39.
273. See id.
274. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 855 (2000). The word "used" appeared in §
844(i) of the federal arson statute, which made it a crime for anyone to "damage[] ... by
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a case-specific meaning, the Court provided a single definition to apply in
all cases. 275
Secondly, the First Circuit placed a great deal of emphasis upon Raich,
which it suggested superseded the Waucaush holding.276 By relying on
Raich, the court rejected the government's argument that the core issue was
its burden of proof and that the case could be resolved by focusing on
evidentiary rather than constitutional questions. This did not, however, stop
the court from siding with the government. It dismissed the notion that
RICO's application to noneconomic intrastate activities raised
constitutional concern and interpreted Raich to permit congressional
regulation of those activities as part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme. 277
The court rejected Nascimento's argument that Stonehurst's criminal
activities were an almost exact match for the violent criminal conduct that
the Lopez and Morrison Courts refused to aggregate. 278 It acknowledged
the federalism concerns raised by Lopez and Morrison, but ultimately
refused to follow those cases' analytical framework. 279 Instead, it adopted
the approach outlined in Raich.280 Raich, it claimed, was more directly on
point than Lopez or Morrison because it presented an as-applied challenge
rather than a facial challenge. 281  Just as the Supreme Court in Raich
refused to "excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory
scheme," so too did the First Circuit. 282
Raich established that the relevant unit of constitutional analysis was not
individual statutory application, but rather the general class of activities that
the statute governs (e.g., drugs, racketeering). 283 As the First Circuit noted,
Given the lessons of Raich, it is evident that [Nascimento's]
constitutional argument-like that of the Waucaush court-
misapprehends the relevant unit of analysis. The linchpin of their
argument is the fact that Stonehurst's activities were undertaken without
an economic motive. In the long run, however, that isolated fact is of
little significance. The correct mode of analysis requires a more global
view....
Thus, the class of activity is the relevant unit of analysis and, within
wide limits, it is Congress-not the courts-that decides how to define a
class of activity. 284
means of fire or an explosive, any ... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in
any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
275. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 39.
276. See id. at 38 n.4.
277. See id. at 41-43.
278. See id. at 41.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 40-43.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 41 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005)).
283. See id. at 42.
284. Id.
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Courts are thus charged with deferring to Congress's method of regulation.
They must dismiss the constitutional challenge if it appears to them that
Congress acted rationally in developing a statute to regulate a class of
activities that bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 285 In
applying that analysis to Nascimento, the First Circuit noted,
Given the obvious ties between organized violence and racketeering
activity-the former is a frequent concomitant of the latter-we defer to
Congress's rational judgment, as part of its effort to crack down on
racketeering enterprises, to enact a statute that targeted organized
violence. 286
Raich led the First Circuit to conclude that RICO's application to
noneconomic intrastate violence was constitutionally sound. This meant
there was no reason to read RICO's "affecting commerce" requirement
differently in the name of constitutional avoidance. The court held that "the
normal requirements of the RICO statute apply. '287
III. REQUIRING A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE FOR
NONECONOMIC GANGS CHARGED UNDER RICO
This Note has detailed the split between the First and Sixth Circuits over
what is sufficient to satisfy RICO's "affecting commerce" requirement in
the case of enterprises engaged in noneconomic intrastate activity. The two
circuits have based their holdings on different Commerce Clause tests. In
holding that prosecutors must demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the Sixth Circuit in Waucaush relied heavily on the version of
the substantial effects test laid out in Lopez and Morrison, as well as the
Jones Court's use of the avoidance doctrine. 288 In holding that the normal
de minimis test applies, the First Circuit in Nascimento rejected the
Waucaush method of analysis in favor of Raich's comprehensive scheme
rationale. 289 This Note advocates that courts should adopt the Waucaush
holding and require noneconomic intrastate enterprises to have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.
On the surface, this particular application of RICO suggests a fairly rigid
mode of analysis. It is tempting to try to fit a potential RICO enterprise into
one of several discrete categories: noneconomic intrastate, economic
intrastate, noneconomic interstate, economic interstate, and so on. Indeed,
for the most part this Note has described Stonehurst and the CFP as
noneconomic intrastate enterprises; and as a matter of pure fact they are.
But such classification oversimplifies the issue of gangs and RICO.
Street gangs are dynamic entities. Rather than classifying them into
certain discrete categories, it is more useful to picture them as existing
285. See id.
286. Id. at 43.
287. Id. at 30.
288. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 261-87 and accompanying text.
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along a spectrum.290 Gangs that are least likely to be charged under RICO
exist at the low end of this spectrum. These gangs are nonviolent,
noneconomic, very loosely organized, and operate only intrastate.291 On
the high end of the spectrum exist those gangs most likely to be charged
under RICO: violent, profit-driven, highly organized, and rigidly
hierarchical groups that maintain coordinated operations in several states.292
Somewhere along that spectrum exists a line that divides constitutional and
unconstitutional RICO prosecutions.
Street gangs, as dynamic entities, are likely to move along that spectrum.
Whereas, at its inception, a gang may exist at one point along the spectrum,
it is likely to move higher up the spectrum as it continues to grow and
evolve. La Cosa Nostra, whose rise to prominence was a driving force
behind RICO's enactment, 293 likely existed at a lower point on the spectrum
in the decades prior to 1970.294 It is not unreasonable to suspect that street
gangs like Stonehurst and the CFP may also evolve and move along that
spectrum. For instance, if to is the time at which Nascimento was indicted,
at t, Stonehurst may start dealing drugs purchased from outside
Massachusetts, and at t2 might start "offering protection" to Boston-area
businesses in return for regular payments. Although at to, Stonehurst is a
noneconomic intrastate enterprise, at t2 it is a decidedly economic venture
with indisputably substantial effects on interstate commerce. This Note
argues that, despite potential criminal evolution, the aforementioned
dividing line sits just above Stonehurst at to.
The best, and perhaps only, argument for prosecuting Stonehurst at to is
preemptive: nip it in the bud. Such an argument, however, presumes
inherently bad evolution. Federal judges are not soothsayers and, absent
actual criminal evolution, should not be granted jurisdiction over gangs
below the dividing line. A criminal justice system that precludes fact-
finders from preempting individual crime cannot simultaneously permit
preemption of enterprise criminality.
A. Scaling Back an Untethered Statutory Expansion
The prosecution of noneconomic street gangs that operate exclusively
intrastate fails not only the preemptive argument, but also various historical
and constitutional arguments. Courts should prevent RICO from extending
to noneconomic intrastate enterprises that only minimally affect interstate
290. Many thanks to Professor Thomas Lee for suggesting the idea of a "gang spectrum."
291. Perhaps the "Red Hand Gang" or the "Little Rascals" would exist at the very lowest
point on the spectrum.
292. La Casa Nostra likely exists at the highest point on the spectrum. See generally
Jacobs and Gouldin, supra note 15 (describing the violence, organization, and economics
behind La Cosa Nostra).
293. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
294. Cf Katzenbach Commission, supra note 42, at 195 (noting that in the years leading
up to the report, La Cosa Nostra had become "increasingly diversified and sophisticated").
2106 [Vol. 76
STREET GANGS AND RICO
commerce because, unlike previous RICO expansions, this one remains
untethered to any logical principle of expansion.
In the past, major criminal RICO expansions were either rooted directly
in RICO's text or produced as the result of a bifocal expansion of criminal
and civil RICO. Turkette expanded RICO from infiltrations to
noninfiltrations and thus solidified RICO's status as a malleable
prosecutorial tool.295 In approving this major expansion, the Court looked
directly to the statute's text.296 The Court noted that "neither the language
nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate 'enterprises.'
Applying it also to criminal organizations does not render any portion of the
statute superfluous nor does it create any structural incongruities within the
framework of the Act."'297 On the other hand, the extension of RICO to
noneconomic intrastate enterprises that only minimally affect interstate
commerce both renders a portion of the act superfluous and creates a
structural incongruity. It renders § 1962(c)'s "affecting commerce"
requirement useless 298 and isolates § 1962(c) as the only subsection of
RICO that targets noneconomic activity. 299
Scheidler produced a major bifocal expansion of RICO and permitted
noneconomic enterprises to be charged under the Act's criminal and civil
components. 300 While the case presented a question as to whether the
plaintiffs had satisfied the elements of a civil RICO claim, 30 1 the holding
touched criminal RICO as well. 30 2 As civil RICO cases permit private
plaintiffs to recover personal losses resulting from the harm perpetrated by
racketeering enterprises, 303 they present far different concerns than criminal
RICO cases. There is no civil analog or bifocal origin to which courts can
point if they wish to extend RICO to noneconomic intrastate enterprises that
only minimally affect interstate commerce-only the lone voice of the
Nascimento court.
The expansion proposed by Nascimento is rooted, if anywhere, in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The First Circuit claimed that Raich
should govern the issue,30 4 but the application of Raich's comprehensive
scheme rationale is legally unsound.
295. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 63.
297.. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
298. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 9, 52-55 and accompanying text. By extension, it would also render
§ 1962(d) a tool for targeting noneconomic activity, since § 1962(d) addresses conspiracy to
commit other RICO offenses.
300. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
302. The Nascimento court briefly discussed the effect of Scheidler on criminal cases.
See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 39 (1st Cir. 2007).
303. Seesupra note 91.
304. See supra notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
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B. The Drawbacks of Applying Raich's Comprehensive Scheme Rationale
In Raich, the Court held that Congress may regulate noneconomic
intrastate activities as part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme so long as
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the regulated class of
activities bore a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 30 5 While at
first blush, this may seem to permit Congress to regulate local gang
violence under RICO, upon closer examination it does not.
Contrary to what the First Circuit claimed in Nascimento, Lopez and
Morrison are more directly on point than Raich. Gun possession in school
zones and gender-motivated violence are the same species of activity as
local gang shootings: all are traditionally state-regulated crimes that have a
tenuous-if any-connection to interstate commerce. Nascimento attempts
to forestall this argument by using Raich to characterize RICO as a
comprehensive scheme that regulates economic activity. 30 6  Raich's
definition of economics, 30 7 however, precludes the classification of RICO
as a comprehensive scheme amenable to the Raich approach.
Limiting its approach to economic activities only, the Court in Raich
defines economics as "the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities. ' ' 30 8 The CSA qualified as economic because it regulates "the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there
is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. '309  The particular
emphasis on the regulation of commodities is omnipresent in the Raich
opinion. The Court's reliance on Wickard v. Filburn's aggregation
principle 3 10 should demonstrate the point: the home consumption of wheat
in Wickard and the local cultivation and use of marijuana in Raich lend
themselves so easily to aggregation under the substantial effects test
because they involve fungible commodities that, by seeping into or being
extracted from the market, directly affect supply, demand, and price.
RICO, however, does not regulate commodities; it regulates behavior.
Although its enactment was driven by organized crime's damage to the
national economy, its ultimate goal, as specified by Congress, was to
eliminate the criminal behavior that caused that damage. 3 11 Nothing in the
legislative history or text of RICO indicated that Congress intended to
target noneconomic intrastate criminal behavior in particular.3 12
Raich claimed that Congress could regulate intrastate marijuana
cultivation and use because it was an essential part of the broader regulatory
305. See supra notes 119, 150 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
308. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
309. Id. at 26.
310. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); supra notes 117-18 and
accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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scheme. 313 RICO, in addition to falling outside the Court's definition of a
comprehensive scheme regulating economic activity, fails to include
noneconomic intrastate activity as an "essential" part of its regulation.
Raich may not have provided any guidance for determining whether a
discrete part of a regulatory scheme is essential, but even the most detailed
examination of RICO is unlikely to yield any evidence that regulation over
noneconomic intrastate activity is "essential" to the Act's continued
success.
In addition to these practical deficiencies, Raich's application to
Nascimento-type situations raises a grave policy concern: As Justice
O'Connor suggested in her Raich dissent, the Court's holding invites
Congress to legislate broadly and threatens to obliterate the delicate federal-
state balance in the regulation of criminal activity.3 14 Lopez and Morrison
advocated respect for traditional areas of state concern,315 but both Raich
and Nascimento disregarded this principle. Nascimento now serves as a
fine example that the Raich decision "allows Congress to regulate intrastate
activity without check."'316
To be sure, a strict federalism argument is susceptible to criticism in this
context. RICO has usurped a wide array of state crimes by way of their
incorporation into the statute as predicate acts, 317 and it seems that after
much judicial expansion potential RICO liability exists whenever more than
one person engages in more than one crime.318 Congressional acquiescence
in the face of such judicial expansion 319 seems to indicate paltry concern for
federalism in the RICO context. But even despite RICO's storied history
and repeated judicial construction, it shares problems with the gun
legislation in Lopez and the gender-motivated violence legislation in
Morrison. Those statutes did not regulate activity that substantially affected
interstate commerce, and thus had to be struck down as unconstitutional. 320
Since section 1962(c) leaves open the possibility of application to intrastate
activity that does not substantially affect interstate commerce, that
application must likewise be deemed unconstitutional.
C. The Guidance of Jones
Jones is the most instructive case on this issue, and Waucaush was
correct in using it to read § 1962(c) as requiring a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. The facts of Jones, Waucaush, and Nascimento are
very similar: In each case, the defendant engaged in noneconomic intrastate
criminal activities and was charged with violating a federal criminal statute
313. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
316. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
317. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 714-15.
318. Seeid. at 713-14.
319. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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that was a part of the Organized Crime Control Act and that had an
"affecting commerce" requirement. The language of § 1962(c) and the
federal arson statute are slightly different, but this is of little significance.321
The Court in Jones rejected an expansive interpretation of the federal
arson statute because it would have permitted Congress to criminalize the
arson of nearly any building and would have drained the statute's
commerce-affecting language of its meaning. 322 Nascimento should have
rejected an expansive interpretation of § 1962(c) on the same grounds. That
holding now threatens to bring any two acts of intrastate gang violence
within the ambit of RICO and essentially to void federal prosecutors'
requirement to prove an effect on interstate commerce.
Waucaush correctly employed the constitutional avoidance doctrine to
read § 1962(c) as requiring a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Indeed, Lopez made it clear that Congress could regulate intrastate activities
only if they substantially affected interstate commerce; 323 therefore,
regulation of intrastate activity that minimally affects interstate commerce
would render RICO constitutionally dubious. Nascimento characterized
Waucaush as an outdated case that was decided before the Supreme Court
weighed in with Raich;324 but Raich only emphasizes the correctness of the
Waucaush holding. Raich did not resolve the issue of federal regulation
over intrastate activities; it only demonstrated that such regulation should
be viewed with greater suspicion.325
Although the Nascimento court used Clark in an attempt to demonstrate
Waucaush's and Jones's shortcomings, its argument reflected a
misapplication of the avoidance doctrine and the lowest common
denominator idea.326  Clark is distinguishable from Waucaush and
Nascimento because the statutes at issue in those cases are markedly
different. The statute at issue in Clark explicitly governed three different
classes of aliens.327 The government, in claiming that there were different
constitutional concerns for each class, argued, in effect, that the statute
implied different kinds of detention authority for each.328 RICO, however,
specifies one category: enterprises whose activities affect interstate
commerce. Requiring a substantial effect for noneconomic enterprises does
not render the statute a chameleon; 329 it simply says that enterprises that fall
outside the spirit of the Act must meet a higher threshold to qualify under
the language of the Act.
Clark noted that courts may "give a statute's ambiguous language a
limiting construction called for by one of the statute's applications, even
321. See supra notes 9, 178 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part III.B.
326. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 182 and accompanying text
328. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
2110 [Vol. 76
STREET GANGS AND RICO
though other of the statute's applications, standing alone, would not support
the same limitation.- 330 In imposing a limiting construction on § 1962(c)'s
application to noneconomic intrastate activity, Waucaush did precisely that.
The argument in Nascimento ignores the two chief principles underlying the
avoidance doctrine: in carving out a new sphere of activity subject to RICO
regulation, it failed either to exercise judicial restraint or to effectuate
congressional intent.331
CONCLUSION
The moment the First Circuit affirmed Jackson Nascimento's conviction,
it became complicit in an unconstitutional expansion of RICO. Section
1962(c) of that Act requires that enterprises like the one with which
Nascimento was affiliated "affect interstate commerce." That language, on
its face, most likely means that the enterprise need only affect interstate
commerce in some minimally discernible way. If the inquiry did indeed
end there, the First Circuit's decision would remain beyond criticism. But
that is not the case. To stay faithful to Congress's decidedly economic
(though not commoditycentric) statutory intent, and to avoid opening the
statute to constitutional challenges under the Commerce Clause, § 1962(c)
should instead be read to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce
when it is applied to noneconomic intrastate enterprises.
It is probably true that, had Nascimento and several of his associates not
been convicted under RICO, their gang would have evolved into a more
archetypal RICO enterprise. That is, the gang likely would have adopted an
economic strategy or expanded interstate, or both. But such presumptions
do not justify RICO's application to an enterprise that, at the time of
prosecution, lies beyond RICO's constitutional reach. Besides, in
Nascimento's case, RICO was not the solitary statutory tool available to the
prosecution. It may have been the lone available tool at the federal level,
but Nascimento was at the same time susceptible to a variety of state law
criminal statutes. It is at that level-the state level-where Nascimento
should have been prosecuted and where members of such street gangs must
be prosecuted in the future.
330. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005).
331. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
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